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Abstract 
 
The unemployment gender gap, defined as the difference between female and male 
unemployment rates, was positive until 1980. This gap virtually disappeared after 1980--except 
during recessions, when men’s unemployment rates always exceed women’s. We study the 
evolution of these gender differences in unemployment from a long-run perspective and over the 
business cycle. Using a calibrated three-state search model of the labor market, we show that the 
rise in female labor force attachment and the decline in male attachment can mostly account for 
the closing of the gender unemployment gap. Evidence from nineteen OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) countries also supports the notion that convergence in 
attachment is associated with a decline in the gender unemployment gap. At the cyclical 
frequency, we find that gender differences in industry composition are important in recessions, 
especially the most recent, but they do not explain gender differences in employment growth 
during recoveries. 
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This paper studies the gender diﬀerences in unemployment from a long-run perspective and over
the business cycle. Figure 1 shows the evolution of unemployment rates by gender for 1948-2010.
The unemployment gender gap, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between female and male unemployment
rates, was positive until 1980, though the gap tended to close during periods of high unemployment.
After 1980, the unemployment gender gap virtually disappeared, except during recessions when
men’s unemployment typically exceeded women’s. This phenomenon was particularly pronounced
for the last recession.
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Figure 1: Unemployment by Gender. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Further examination of the data conﬁrms the visual impression. As Figure 2 shows, the gender
gap in trend unemployment rates, which started positive and was particularly pronounced in the
1960s and 1970s, vanished by 1980. Instead the cyclical properties of the gender gap in unemploy-
ment have been steady over the last 60 years, with male unemployment rising more than female
unemployment during recessions. This suggests that the evolution of the unemployment gender gap
is driven by long-run trends.
We ﬁrst examine whether changes in the composition of the labor force can explain the evolution
of the unemployment gender gap. We ﬁnd that the growth in women’s education relative to men’s
and changes in the age structure and in industry distribution by gender have only minor eﬀects on its
evolution, suggesting that compositional changes are not the major factors driving this phenomenon.
Our hypothesis is that the disappearance of the unemployment gender gap is due to the con-
vergence in labor force attachment of men and women; in particular, it is a consequence of the
drastic increase in female attachment and the notable decline in male attachment. Shrinking labor
force participation gap is probably the most important indication of this convergence. The labor
force participation rate for women increased from 43% in 1970 to 60% in 2000 while for men it
declined from 80% in 1970 to 75% in 2000. We also show that the eﬀect of convergence in labor
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Figure 2: Unemployment by Gender: Trend and Cyclical Components. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
force attachment is visible in labor market ﬂows that involve the participation decision. Women
have become less likely to leave employment for nonparticipation—a sign of increased labor force
attachment—while men have become more likely to leave the labor force from unemployment and
less likely to re-enter the labor force once they leave it—a sign of decreased labor force attachment,
(Abraham and Shimer, 2002).
To explore this hypothesis, we develop a search model of unemployment populated by agents of
diﬀerent gender and skill. To understand the role of the convergence in labor force attachment, the
model diﬀerentiates between nonparticipation and unemployment and thus has three distinct labor
market states: employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation. In every period, employed agents
can quit their current position to unemployment or nonparticipation. If they don’t quit, they face an
exogenous separation shock. If they separate, they may choose unemployment or nonparticipation.
Unemployed workers can continue searching for a job or choose not to participate. Workers who
are out of the labor force can choose to search for a job or remain in their current state.
Agents’ quit and search decisions are inﬂuenced by aggregate labor market conditions and their
individual opportunity cost of being in the labor force. The latter variable, which can be interpreted
simply as the value of leisure or the value of home production for an individual worker, is higher
on average for women to reﬂect barriers to women’s labor force participation.1 We assume that
the individual opportunity cost of work is private information, but its distribution by gender is
publicly known. Individual skills are also observable and there are separate job markets for each
skill group. Wages for men are set within each skill group to split the surplus of production between
ﬁrm and workers. We impose that ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between hiring workers of a given skill level.
Because women have greater opportunity cost of working, they have higher quit rates. Consequently,
they generate lower surplus for the ﬁrm and receive lower wages conditional on skill. Firms and
1These include medical conditions associated with pregnancy and childbirth, responsibility for the care of depen-
dent family members and other chores, discrimination and so on. We discuss this in detail in Section 3.
2equilibrium matching are modeled as in Pissarides (2000).
Gender diﬀerences in the skill composition and in the distribution of the opportunity cost of
being in the labor force determine the gender gaps in participation, unemployment and wages in
equilibrium. We assess the contribution of changing labor market attachment of men and women to
the evolution of the gender unemployment gap with a calibrated version of this model, using 1978
and 1996 as two comparison years. We ﬁrst fully calibrate the model to 1978, and then change the
parameters to match the empirical skill distribution, skill premium and labor force participation by
gender in 1996, allowing for the unemployment rate to be determined endogenously. We ﬁnd that
our model explains almost all of the convergence in the unemployment rates by gender between
1978 and 1996. The convergence in labor force attachment is the most important factor, accounting
for almost half of the decline in the gender unemployment gap over this period.
The link between convergence in attachment and in unemployment rates by gender is also
supported by international evidence. Based on data from 19 advanced OECD economies starting
in the early 1970s, we ﬁnd that countries with lower participation gaps, on average, exhibit lower
unemployment gaps and most countries which have experienced closing participation gaps over time
have experienced closing unemployment gaps.
We also analyze the determinants of unemployment by gender at the cyclical frequency. We ﬁnd
that the unemployment rate rises more for men than women during recessions. We show that gender
diﬀerences in industry distribution have been important in explaining this discrepancy. However,
this factor does not play a role in the gender diﬀerences in employment growth in the recoveries,
which are mostly driven by participation trends.
Our paper contributes to two main strands of work. A growing literature has analyzed the
convergence of labor market outcomes for men and women. See Galor and Weil (1996), Costa
(2000), Greenwood, Sheshadri and Yorukoglu (2005), Goldin (2006), Albanesi and Olivetti (2009
and 2010), Fernandez and Wong (2011), and Fernandez (2013). These papers typically focus on the
evolution of the labor force participation rate and gender diﬀerences in wages. While our model has
implications for both participation and wages, our main focus is the evolution of the unemployment
gender gap. Our paper is also related to the empirical and theoretical literature on labor market
ﬂows. The literature on labor market ﬂows typically focuses on two-state models where there is
no role for the participation decision. We build on a recent body of work that incorporates the
participation decision into search and matching models, such as Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) and
Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson, and Şahin (2011, 2012). Our paper is the ﬁrst paper that studies
gender diﬀerences in a three-state framework.
An important implication of our analysis is the tight connection between labor force attachment
and the unemployment rate. This issue is particularly important because the labor market weakness
that has prevailed since the beginning of the Great Recession in 2007 was also accompanied by a
notable decline in the participation rate. Various factors, like the aging of the population and
the ﬂattening of female participation, suggest the possibility of a less attached labor force going
forward. We use our model to assess the importance of this factor and show that a 5 percentage
3point decline in the labor force participation rate arising from declining attachment would increase
the unemployment rate by 0.2 percentage points, all else being equal. This calculation shows that
the common wisdom that a declining participation would cause a decline in the unemployment rate
is misguided.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical evidence on the
changing composition of the labor force and its role in the evolution of the gender unemployment
gap. Section 3 introduces our hypothesis and discusses the changes in labor force attachment of men
and women. The model is presented in Section 4. The calibration and the quantitative analysis are
reported in Section 5. The eﬀect of labor force attachment on the unemployment rate is discussed
in Section 6. Section 7 discusses the cyclical properties of gender unemployment gaps. Section 8
presents the international evidence, and Section 9 concludes.
2 Changes in the Composition of the Labor Force
There are well-documented patterns for unemployment by worker characteristics. For example,
as discussed in Mincer (1991) and Shimer (1998), low-skilled and younger workers tend to have
higher unemployment rates. If female workers were relatively younger and less educated before
1980, that could account for their higher unemployment rates. To address this issue, we examine
the inﬂuence of age and education compositions of the female and male labor force on the evolution
of the unemployment gender gap. In addition to these worker characteristics, we consider changes
in the distribution of men and women across industries.
2.1 Age Composition
Female workers were young relative to male workers before 1990 as the left panel of Figure 3 shows.
This observation suggests that age composition can potentially contribute to the convergence in
male and female unemployment rates.
To assess the quantitative importance of age composition, we follow the methodology in Shimer
(1998) and isolate the eﬀect of changing age composition by computing counterfactual unemploy-
ment rates. To this end, we ﬁrst divide the unemployed population into two gender groups, men,
m, and women, f. Each group is then divided into three age groups: Am = f16-24, 25-54, 55+g and
Af = f16-24, 25-54, 55+ g. Let ls
t(i) be the fraction of workers who are in group i at time t, and
let us
t(i) be the unemployment rate for workers who are in group i at time t. Then unemployment
rate for gender s at time t is
us
t =
X
i2As
ls
t(i)us
t(i): (1)
where s 2 fm;fg. We then calculate a counterfactual unemployment rate, ~ u
f
t , for women by
assuming that the age composition of the female labor force were the same as men’s, i.e. l
f
t (i) =
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Figure 3: Average age of the labor force by gender (left panel) and the actual and counterfactual unemployment
rates (right panel). Source: Current Population Survey.
lm
t (i).
~ u
f
t =
X
i2Af
lm
t (i)u
f
t (i): (2)
The right panel of Figure 3 shows both the actual and counterfactual female unemployment rates
against the male unemployment rate. Since the female labor force before 2000 was younger than
the male labor force, the counterfactual female unemployment rate lies below the actual female
unemployment rate. However, this eﬀect is clearly not big enough to explain the gender gap in
unemployment rates. After 2000, since the age diﬀerence disappeared, there is no diﬀerence between
the actual and counterfactual unemployment rates.
2.2 Education Composition
Another compositional change is the diﬀerence between the skill levels of men and women. The left
panel of Figure 4 shows the average years of schooling for workers 25 years of age and older.2 To
compute average years of schooling, we divide the labor force into four education groups, Ae={less
than a high school diploma, high school diploma, some college or an associate degree, college degree
and above}. We then calculate the average skill of the labor force by gender as
X
i2Ae
l
j
t(i)y(i) (3)
where l
j
t(i) is the fraction of education category for gender j and y(i) is the average years of schooling
corresponding to that category.3
2We impose this age restriction since we are interested in completed educational attainment. Consequently, the
unemployment rates in Figure 4 are diﬀerent from the overall unemployment rates.
3We use 10 years for less than a high school diploma, 12 years for high school diploma, 14 years for some college
or an associate degree, and 18 years for college degree and higher. Note that the education deﬁnition changed in the
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Figure 4: Average years of schooling of the labor force by gender (left panel) and the actual and counterfactual
unemployment rates (right panel). Source: Current Population Survey.
The left panel of Figure 4 shows that before 1990, female workers were on average less educated
than male workers. Between 1990 and 1995, the education ratio converged and after 1995, women
became relatively more educated. We calculate a counterfactual unemployment rate for women by
assigning the male education composition to the female labor force, i.e. l
f
t (i) = lm
t (i). The right
panel of Figure 4 shows both the actual and counterfactual female unemployment rates against the
male unemployment rate. The importance of skill composition is very small until 1990. As female
education attainment rises after 1990, the counterfactual unemployment rate for women becomes
higher. This counterfactual exercise shows that the change in the skill distribution has had a minimal
impact on the gender unemployment gap. While these counterfactuals are convincing, we follow
Shimer (1998) in interpreting demographic adjustment for education cautiously, and incorporate
skill heterogeneity when we develop our model in Section 4 which allows us to quantify the eﬀect of
the change in skill composition independently. Our model ultimately conﬁrms the ﬁndings of this
counterfactual and shows that changes in the skill composition were quantitatively unimportant for
the evolution of the unemployment gender gap.4
2.3 Industry Composition
There have always been considerable diﬀerences between the distribution of female and male workers
across diﬀerent industries. In general, goods-producing industries, like construction and manufac-
turing, employ mostly male workers while most female workers work in the service-providing and
CPS in 1992. Prior to 1992, the categories were High school: Less than 4 years and 4 years and College: 1 to 3 years
and 4 years or more. These categories are very similar to the post-1992 ones.
4Shimer (1998) argues that demographic adjustments for skill might be misguided for two reasons: First, the
absolute level of education may be less important than relative education attainment. Second, the fact that more-
educated workers tend to be more skilled does not imply that increases in education raise the skill level of the labor
force. See pages 45 and 46 in Shimer (1998) for a detailed discussion.
6government sectors.5 As the economy moved away from manufacturing to a more service-based
structure, the fraction of both male and female workers in the goods-producing sector declined. To
assess the role of changing industry composition, we calculate a counterfactual unemployment rate
for women by assigning the male industry composition to the female labor force to isolate the role
of industry distributions. Figure 5 shows both the actual and counterfactual female unemployment
rates against the male unemployment rate. The industry composition does not aﬀect the evolu-
tion of trend unemployment rates. However, its impact is important during recessions. If women
had men’s industry distribution, their unemployment rate would have gone up more during the
recessions.
Similar to diﬀerences in industry composition, gender diﬀerences in the distribution of workers
across occupations have also been sizable. In Appendix B we repeat the same counterfactual exercise
using 2-digit SOCs (Standard Occupational Classiﬁcation) and also following Acemoglu and Autor
(2011)’s occupation classiﬁcations and ﬁnd that occupational composition does not account for the
evolution of the gender unemployment gap.
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Figure 5: Actual and counterfactual unemployment rates (industry). Source: Current Population Survey
We conclude that gender diﬀerences in age, skill, and industry composition cannot account for
the evolution of the gender unemployment gap. However, we ﬁnd that industry distribution plays
an important role in explaining cyclical patterns. We return to this point in Section 7.
3 Convergence in Labor Force Attachment
Our hypothesis is that the evolution of the gender unemployment gap was due to the convergence
in labor market attachment of women and men. As women have become more attached to the labor
force, men have become less attached, reducing the diﬀerence in the degree of labor force attachment.
5Figure 14 in the Appendix shows the fraction of male and female workers employed in the goods-producing,
service-providing, and government sectors.
7In this section, we examine various statistics that are inﬂuenced by labor force attachment to
document this convergence. In particular, we focus on labor force participation, interruption in
employment spells, unemployment duration, and labor market ﬂows.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the labor force participation rate for men and women starting in
1970. As the ﬁgure shows, women had considerably lower labor force participation rates in the 1970s.
Among working age women, a higher fraction was not in the labor force (Goldin, 1990). Moreover,
those who ever participated in the labor force experienced more frequent spells of nonparticipation
(Royalty, 1998), especially in childbearing years. The evolution of labor force behavior in connection
to pregnancy and child birth is documented in the 2008 Current Population Report on “Maternity
Leave and Employment Patterns of First-time Mothers: 1961-2003.” This report shows that women
are now more likely to work both during pregnancy and after child birth. Whereas in 1976-1980,
the fraction of women who stopped working two months or more before the end of pregnancy was
41%, that ratio dropped to 23% in 1996-2000. Among women who worked during pregnancy 36%
quit their jobs in 1981-1985 and this fraction dropped to 26% by 1996-2000. Leave arrangements
that allow women to keep their positions became more widespread. The fraction of women who
used paid/unpaid leave after childbirth increased from 71% in 1981-1985 to 87% in 1996-2000.6
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Figure 6: Labor force participation rates by gender. Source: Current Population Survey.
On the contrary, for men, labor force attachment got weaker. The labor force participation
rate of men declined from 80% in 1970 to 75% in 2000 as Figure 6 shows. Moreover full-year
nonemployment, an indication of permanent withdrawal from the labor force, increased among
prime-age men. The amount of joblessness accounted for by those who did not work at all over the
year more than tripled, from 1.8% in the 1960s to 6.1% in 1999-2000, (Juhn, Murphy, and Topel,
2002).7
6See Table 5 in the report.
7 The decline in male participation is typically attributable to two factors: an expansion of the disability beneﬁts
8Another dimension of convergence in labor market attachment is the shrinking gender gap in
unemployment duration (Abraham and Shimer, 2002). Figure 7 plots the evolution of average
duration of men and women. As the ﬁgure shows, men on average experienced substantially longer
unemployment spells relative to women until 1990s. Starting in the 1990s, women’s average duration
increased to values similar to men’s. This observation alone suggests that women’s unemployment
rate should have increased relative to men’s as their unemployment duration got longer, implying
an increasing unemployment gender gap instead of a shrinking one. This of course is a simplistic
argument since it ignores the other determinants of the unemployment rate, i.e. various ﬂows
between three labor market states.
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Figure 7: Duration of unemployment for men and women. Source: Current Population Survey.
For a complete picture of the determinants of the unemployment rate, we examine the evolution
of the ﬂow rates between unemployment, employment and nonparticipation in Figure 8. As the
ﬁgure shows, the convergence in labor force attachment of men and women has aﬀected the labor
market ﬂow rates that involve the participation decision. Women have become less likely to leave
employment for nonparticipation—a sign of increased labor force attachment—while men have be-
come more likely to leave the labor force from unemployment and less likely to re-enter the labor
force once they leave it—a sign of decreased labor force attachment. For example, employment-to-
nonparticipation ﬂow rates were more than twice as high for women as for men in 1970s and this
gap closed by 50% percent by mid-1990s as shown in Figure 8. Similarly, there was convergence in
ﬂows rates between nonparticipation and unemployment. Figure 8 also shows that ﬂows between
unemployment and employment did not exhibit any convergence, ruling out the potential explana-
tion that the disappearance of the gender unemployment gap was due to convergence in job-loss or
job-ﬁnding rates.
program (Autor and Duggan, 2003) and low levels of real wages of less-skilled men during the 1990s (Juhn, Murphy,
and Topel, 2002).
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Figure 8: Labor Market ﬂow rates by gender. Source: Current Population Survey.
As we have shown, the empirical evidence suggests strong convergence in labor force attachment
for men and women. However, at ﬁrst glance, it is not obvious that all these patterns are consistent
with a closing unemployment gender gap. Most importantly, we have discussed that women’s dura-
tion of unemployment increased relative to men’s starting in the 1990s. An increase in the duration
of unemployment clearly causes an increase in the unemployment rate and seems inconsistent with
our hypothesis. It is true that if attachment only aﬀected the duration of unemployment for women,
everything else being equal, the female unemployment rate would have risen. However, as female
attachment got stronger, women also became less likely to leave employment for nonparticipation
and experience unemployment when trying to return to the labor force after nonparticipation spells.
These changes caused a drastic increase in employment, counteracting the rise in the unemployment
duration.
To summarize, the evidence we surveyed suggests that the evolution of the gender gap in un-
employment cannot be explained without considering the drastic change in women’s labor force
participation and the relatively smaller but still evident decline in men’s participation. Therefore,
in the next section, we examine a search model of unemployment with a participation margin in
order to capture the joint evolution of participation and unemployment gender gaps.
104 Model
We consider an economy populated by agents of diﬀerent gender, in equal numbers. Agents are risk
neutral. They diﬀer by their opportunity cost of being in the labor force and by skill.8 There are
three distinct labor market states: employment (E), unemployment (U) and nonparticipation (N).
In every period, employed agents can quit their current position into unemployment or nonpartic-
ipation. If they don’t quit, they face an exogenous separation shock. If they separate, they may
choose unemployment or nonparticipation. Unemployed workers can continue searching for a job
or choose not to participate. Workers who are out of the labor force can choose to search for a job
or remain in their current state.
Agents’ quit and search decisions are inﬂuenced by their individual opportunity cost of working.
This variable is stochastic and can be interpreted simply as the value of leisure or the value of home
production for an individual worker. Its distribution varies by gender and it is publicly known,
whereas individual realizations of this variable are private information. The distribution of the
opportunity cost of working is i.i.d. by gender over time. In each period, agents may receive a new
draw of their opportunity cost of working, with a certain constant probability, which also varies
by gender. We assume that women have higher on average and more dispersed opportunity costs
of working and a higher probabilities of drawing a new value of this cost in any period. Some
examples of shocks to the opportunity cost of work that we are aiming to capture include poor
health or disability (own or of family members), pregnancy and childbirth, and change in income of
household members. Gender diﬀerences in the distribution of the opportunity cost of work and the
frequency of its changes over time are intended to capture the relative barriers to women’s labor
force participation and diﬀerences in attachment by sex that have been discussed in the literature
on female labor force participation.
Individual skills are observable and there are two skill levels with separate job markets. Hours
of work are ﬁxed and wages are determined according to a surplus splitting arrangement for men
within each skill group. We consider a variety of wage determination mechanisms for women. Our
baseline case is one in which ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between hiring workers of a given skill level. Since
women have a greater opportunity cost of working, they have higher quit rates, and consequently
generate lower surplus for the ﬁrm, and will receive lower wages. This mechanism endogenously
generates gender wage gaps, within each skill group.
When a ﬁrm and a worker meet and form a match, job creation takes place. Before a match
can be formed, a ﬁrm must post a vacancy. All ﬁrms are small and each has one job that is vacant
when they enter the job market. The number of jobs is endogenous and determined by proﬁt
maximization. Free entry ensures that expected proﬁts from each vacancy are zero. The job-ﬁnding
prospects of each worker are determined by a matching function, following Pissarides (2000).
8The skill distribution by gender is exogenous as the model abstracts from human capital investment decisions.
We also exclude diﬀerences in marital status, even as most of the convergence in labor force participation rates and
unemployment rates by gender in the aggregate are determined by the behavior of married women. This modeling
choice is driven by the fact that some key labor market statistics we use in the calibration are not available by marital
status, or are subject to large measurement error at that level of disaggregation.
114.1 Workers’ Problem
The economy is populated by a continuum of unit measure of workers, of diﬀerent gender, j = f;m.
Workers of each gender also diﬀer by skill, where h denotes high-skill workers, and l low-skill workers.
Worker skill aﬀects productivity, yi, with i = l;h, with yh > yl.
Each worker can be in one of three states: employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force
(nonparticipant). In addition, each worker is characterized by her realization of an idiosyncratic
shock x ¸ 0. This variable represents the opportunity cost of being in the work force and can be
interpreted as the value of home production for the worker. The cumulative distribution function
of x is represented by Fj(x) for j = f;m, which is i.i.d. over time and across workers of a given
gender.
The ﬂow values for the worker of type ij, depend on her realized value of x and her labor market
status, and if she is employed, on the wage, w. They are deﬁned as follows. For the employed:
vE
ij(x;w) = w + (1 ¡ e)x;
for the unemployed:
vU
ij(x) = (1 ¡ s)x;
and for individuals out of the labor force:
vN
ij(x) = x;
where e 2 (0;1] is the fraction of time devoted to market work if employed, s 2 [0;1] is the fraction
of time devoted to job search if unemployed. The values of a worker as a function of her current x
will be denoted by V E
ij (x;w) for an employed worker, V U
ij (x) for am unemployed worker and V N
ij (x)
for workers who are out of the labor force.
Each individual draws a value of x at time 0 and samples a new draw of x in each period
with probability ¸ij 2 [0;1]. With probability 1 ¡ ¸ij, individual’s x remains the same as in the
previous period.9 We assume that the new value of x, denoted with x0, is drawn at the beginning
of the period. In addition, employed agents may experience an exogenous separation shock, with
probability ±ij 2 (0;1), while unemployed agents may receive a job oﬀer with probability pi 2 [0;1]
which is determined in equilibrium.10 The separation and job-ﬁnding shocks for that period are
also realized before the agent can make any decisions.
Under these assumptions on timing, workers’ value functions take on following form.
9Note that even though the distribution of x is i.i.d., due to this feature of the model, there is persistence in x at
the individual level.
10We allow the probabilities ¸ and ± to vary by gender and skill in order to match selected labor market ﬂow rates
by gender and skill in the quantitative analysis. The job-ﬁnding rate p will vary by skill in equilibrium, thus, we
incorporate this feature in the worker’s problem.
12For employed individuals:
V E
ij (x;w) = vE
ij(x;w) + ¸ij¯
Z xj
xj
£
(1 ¡ ±ij)max
©
V E
ij (x0;w);V U
ij (x0;w);V N
ij (x0;w)
ª¤
dFj(x0)
+¸ij¯
Z xj
xj
£
±ijmax
©
V U
ij (x0;w);V N
ij (x0;w)
ª¤
dFj(x0)
+(1 ¡ ¸ij)¯
£
(1 ¡ ±ij)V E
ij (x;w) + ±ijmax
©
V U
ij (x;w);V N
ij (x;w)
ª¤
; (4)
with i = l;h and j = f;m, where ¯ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor and xj, xj are the extremes of the
support of the distribution of x for j = f;m. The value function reﬂects that an agent who receives
a new value of opportunity cost of work, x0, which occurs with probability ¸ij, and does not receive
a separation shock chooses between remaining in the job or quitting to unemployment or nonpar-
ticipation. If she does experience a separation shock, she may choose only between unemployment
and nonparticipation. If instead she does not draw a new value of x, which occurs with probability
1 ¡ ¸ij, she continues in that state as long as she does not receive a separation shock. If she is hit
by a separation shock, then she chooses between unemployment and nonparticipation.
For unemployed individuals, the value function is:
V U
ij (x;w) = vU
ij(x) + ¸ij¯
Z xj
xj
£
pimax
©
V E
ij (x0;w);V U
ij (x0;w);V N
ij (x0;w)
ª¤
dFj(x0)
+¸ij¯
Z xj
xj
£
(1 ¡ pi)max
©
V U
ij (x0;w);V N
ij (x0;w)
ª¤
dFj(x0)
+(1 ¡ ¸ij)¯
£
pimax
©
V E
ij (x;w);V U
ij (x)
ª
+ (1 ¡ pi)V U
ij (x;w)
¤
: (5)
Thus, an unemployed worker, who draws a new value of x in the period and receives a job oﬀer
decides between becoming employed, remaining unemployed or exiting the labor force. If instead
she does not receive a job oﬀer, she chooses between unemployment and nonparticipation. If the
worker does not draw a new value of x in the current period, she will choose between employment
and remaining unemployed if she does receive a job oﬀer, and will remain unemployed otherwise.
Finally, nonparticipants solve the following problem:
V N
ij (x;w) = vN
ij(x) + ¸ij¯
Z xj
xj
max
©
V U
ij (x0;w);V N
ij (x0;w)
ª
dFj(x0) + (1 ¡ ¸ij)¯V N
ij (x;w): (6)
This problem reﬂects that a nonparticipant would only consider entering the labor force if she draws
a new value of the opportunity cost of work x. In that case, she will transition into unemployment
for at least one period.
A worker who does not receive a new value of x in the current period will prefer to remain in
her current state, unless an exogenous shock hits, such as a separation shock for employed workers,
or a job-ﬁnding shock for the unemployed. Since x is i.i.d., an unemployed worker with a job oﬀer
has the same problem of an employed worker who has not been separated. Similarly, an employed
13worker who has just been separated faces the same choice as an unemployed worker without a job
oﬀer.
Workers’ optimal policies can be represented in the form of cut-oﬀ rules, deﬁned as follows.
A worker with current opportunity cost of working x0 will prefer employment over unemployment
if x0 · xa
ij(w) and will prefer unemployment if x0 > xa
ij(w). She will prefer employment over
nonparticipation for x0 · x
q
ij(w) and nonparticipation to employment for x0 > x
q
ij(w). A worker
will choose unemployment over nonparticipation for x · xn
ij(w) and will prefer nonparticipation
for x > xn
ij(w). The threshold levels for the cut-oﬀ rules depend on the wage through the value of
employment and unemployment.
The solution to these optimization problems gives rise to worker ﬂows in equilibrium. The
pattern of worker ﬂows depends on the relation between the cut-oﬀ levels x
q
ij(w); xn
ij(w), and xa
ij(w)
that we derive in Appendix C.
4.2 Firms’ Problem and Equilibrium
There are separate job markets for each skill group and wages are chosen to split the surplus between
the ﬁrm and the worker. Given that ﬁrms do not observe the worker’s individual opportunity cost
of working and since the distribution of x depends on gender, wages may only depend on gender
within each skill group. In addition, the value of a job ﬁlled by a female and a male worker is
diﬀerent. In particular, since x is on average higher for women, women have higher quit rates and
generate lower surplus for the ﬁrm. If the diﬀerence in surplus generated by a male and female
worker is larger than the discounted vacancy creation cost, then the ﬁrms will not hire women. To
rule out this outcome, we ﬁrst determine the wage for men for each skill group and then consider
diﬀerent alternatives for female wages.
Our baseline case imposes that female wages are such that the surplus to a ﬁrm is equalized across
genders. This wage determination mechanism links labor force attachment to gender diﬀerences in
wages and endogenously generates gender wage gaps, within each skill group. As we show in the
next section, around 10% of gender diﬀerences in wages are explained by this channel. In Section
5.4.1, we consider various other wage-setting mechanisms and repeat our quantitative experiments
using these mechanisms.
Wage and Proﬁt Functions Production is carried out by a continuum of unit measure of ﬁrms
using only labor. Firms are active when they hire a worker, and each ﬁrm can hire at most one
worker. Each ﬁrm posts a vacancy, at a cost ci > 0 for i = l;h, in order to hire a worker who will
produce in the following period. There is free entry in the ﬁrm sector.
All workers with the same skill level are equally productive. Since the individual opportunity
cost of working is private information, wages vary by skill and by gender, as we describe below.
The value of a ﬁlled job at wage w, which we denote as Jij(w), is given by:
14Jij(w) = yi¡w+¯
(Z minfx
q
ij(w);xa
ij(w)g
xj
£
(1 ¡ ±ij)J0
ij(w) + ±Vi
¤
dFj(x0) +
Z xj
minfx
q
ij(w);xa
ij(w)g
VidFj(x0)
)
:
(7)
The ﬁrst term is the ﬂow value of a ﬁlled job, given by productivity minus the wage. Firms discount
the future at the same rate as workers. As discussed above, workers may quit to unemployment
or nonparticipation if x > min(x
q
ij(w);xa
ij(w)). If the worker does not quit, the job could still get
destroyed exogenously with probability ±ij. In this case, the ﬁrm creates a vacancy with value Vi.
If the worker does quit, the ﬁrm will again create a vacancy. As long as x is i.i.d., Jij(w) does not
depend on x.
We assume that x is not observed, while gender and skill are observed. Firms oﬀer a wage wij
conditional on observables, based on their assessment of the characteristics of workers who they
might be matched to. For a given candidate equilibrium wage, the distribution of characteristics for
unemployed workers is determined by the workers’ optimal policy functions. We assume that ﬁrms
know the distribution of characteristics in the pool of currently unemployed workers. However, the
probability of acceptance, given that pool, depends on the actual wage being oﬀered by ﬁrms. Thus,
to compute the equilibrium wage, we proceed as follows, beginning with the male wage.
Let wim denote a candidate equilibrium male wage based on which men choose to be in the
labor force, given their value functions V E
im(x;w); V U
im(x;w); V N
im(x;w); and their policy functions
xa
im(w); x
q
im(w); xn
im(w). Then, ﬁrms will choose a wage ^ wim to solve the following surplus splitting
problem:
wim = argmax ^ w
"Z minfxa
im(wm);x
q
im(wim)g
xm
max
©
0;
¡
V E
im(x; ^ w) ¡ max
©
V U
im(x; ^ w);V N
im(x; ^ w)
ª¢ª
dFm(x)
#°
£[Jim( ^ w)Qim( ^ w;wim) ¡ Vi]
1¡° ; (8)
where
Q( ^ wij;wij) =
R minfxa
ij( ^ wij);x
q
ij( ^ wij)g
xj dFj(x)
R minfxa
ij(wij);x
q
ij(wij)g
xj dFj(x)
;
for j = f;m. Here, V E
im(x;w) ¡ max
©
V U
im(x;w);V N
im(x;w)
ª
¸ 0 is the surplus for the worker,
Jim( ^ wim)Qim( ^ w;wim)¡Vi ¸ 0 is the expected surplus for the ﬁrm and 0 · ° · 1 is the bargaining
weight of the worker.
The function Q( ^ wij;wij) represents the fraction of workers of type ij who are in the labor force
given that the candidate equilibrium wage is wij, and would accept a job oﬀer at wage ^ wij. With
this formulation, the ﬁrm understands that by oﬀering a lower wage it will reduce the size of the
pool of workers that will accept the job, and conditional on accepting, workers will be more likely
to quit. On the other hand, a lower wage will increase current proﬁts for the ﬁrm. The solution to
15this wage setting problem delivers a policy function: ^ wij(w). The ﬁxed point of this policy function
constitutes the equilibrium wage:
w¤
ij = ^ wij(w¤
ij):
Since the opportunity cost of work, x, is privately observed and wages do not vary with this variable,
low x workers will earn informational rents, which will reduce the surplus of the ﬁrm.11
We consider several alternative mechanisms for the determination of female wages. In the
baseline case, we impose that ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between hiring female and male workers, for a
given skill level. Thus, we determine female wages conditional on skill levels by imposing:
Jif(w¤
if) = Jim(w¤
im) (9)
for i = l;h. This restriction pins down the female/male wage ratio for each skill level. We denote
the optimal value of a ﬁlled job with Ji.
Since the value of a ﬁlled job does not depend on gender, the value of a vacancy only depends
on skill and is given by:
Vi = ¡ci + Âi¯Ji; (10)
for i = l;h, where Âi is the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy, determined in equilibrium.
In Section 5.4.1, we describe the behavior of the model under several alternative wage setting
arrangements for female workers.
Equilibrium Conditions We assume free entry so that Vi = 0 for i = l;h. This implies that in
equilibrium, using equation 9, the following restriction will hold:
Ji = ci=Âi¯: (11)
for i = l;h.
Following Pissarides (2000), ﬁrms meet workers according to the matching function, Mi(ui;vi)
for i = l;h, where ui is the number of unemployed workers and vi is the number of vacancies for
skill i. Mi(¢) is increasing in both arguments, concave, and homogeneous of degree 1. The ratio
µi = vi=ui corresponds to market tightness in the labor market for workers with skill i = l;h. Then,
the job-ﬁnding rate is:
pi := Mi(ui;vi)=ui = pi(µi); (12)
while the probability that a vacancy will be ﬁlled is:
Âi := Mi(ui;vi)=vi = Âi(µi); (13)
with p0
i(µi) > 0 and Â0
i(µi) < 0, and pi(µi) = µiÂi(µi) for i = l;h.
11 In equilibrium, Q(w
¤
ij;w
¤
ij) = 1, so that the realized surplus for a ﬁrm employing a male worker is Jim(w
¤
im)¡Vi.
164.3 Stationary Equilibrium
Since there are no aggregate shocks, we consider stationary equilibria deﬁned as follows:
² Household value functions, V U
ij (x;w), V N
ij (x;w) and V E
ij (x;w) and policy functions xa
ij(w),
x
q
ij(w) and xn
ij(w) satisfy equations 4, 5, 6.
² Firms’ value functions, Jij and Vi satisfy equations 7 and 10.
² Wages satisfy equations 8 and 9.
² The job-ﬁnding and vacancy-ﬁlling rates satisfy equations 12 and 13, and the free entry con-
dition (equation 11) holds.
² The laws of motion for labor market stocks (U, E, and N), derived in Appendix C, are
satisﬁed.
5 Quantitative Analysis
We now proceed to calibrate our model and run a series of experiments to assess the contribution
of convergence in labor market attachment to the convergence of unemployment rates by gender.
Speciﬁcally, we set the base year to be 1978, and calibrate the model to this date. This choice of
base year is motivated by the fact that detailed gross ﬂows data become available starting from
1976. In addition, 1978 is the midpoint between the peak and trough of the 1975-80 expansion.12
The key data targets for the 1978 calibration are participation rates and unemployment rates by
gender.
We then set our target year to be 1996. We choose this date because it is also the midpoint in
an expansion, the aggregate unemployment rate is very similar to the one in 1978, and convergence
in labor force participation had mostly occurred by then. To assess the model’s predictions for
1996, we change the parameters of the distribution of the opportunity cost of working to match
participation rates by gender only, in order to replicate the convergence in attachment, and allow the
unemployment rates to respond endogenously. This exercise enables us to quantify the contribution
of the convergence in attachment to the convergence in unemployment rates. We also assess the
role of other factors, such as the change in the skill composition by gender and the rise in the skill
premium, both in isolation and jointly with the convergence in participation rates. We ﬁnd that the
convergence in participation rates is the most important determinant of the closing of the gender
unemployment gap.
Throughout the quantitative analysis, we assume that x follows a generalized Pareto distribution
with tail index (shape) parameter ·j 6= 0, scale parameter equal to 1, and threshold parameter
xj ¸ 0. We allow the tail index and threshold parameters to vary by gender. In addition, for
12As we have shown, the male unemployment rate is more cyclical leading to cyclicality in the gender unemployment
gap. By picking the midpoint of the expansion, we tried to isolate the long-term behavior of the unemployment gender
gap. The gender gap in unemployment in 1978 is equal to the average of this variable in the 70s.
17computational purposes, we truncate the right tail of the x distribution at xj for j = f;m. This
yields two gender speciﬁc parameters to calibrate for the x distribution.
5.1 Calibration
We now describe the 1978 calibration. Our general strategy is to set some parameters based on
independent evidence, and determine the rest in order to match some key moments in the data.
We ﬁrst set some of the parameters using independent evidence. We interpret the model as
monthly and set the discount rate, ¯, accordingly to 0:996. We target the population of workers older
than 25 years of age since we focus on completed education. We set the educational composition
of the labor force by skill and gender to their empirical values in 1978. We assume that the
matching function is Cobb-Douglass and set the elasticity of the matching function with respect to
unemployment, ®, to 0:72 following Shimer (2005). Worker’s bargaining power, °, is set to the same
value.13 We set e to 0:625 corresponding to a work day of 10 hours out of 16 active hours. The
parameter s is calibrated to 0:125 to match the 2 hour per day job search time reported in Krueger
and Mueller (2011). We set the vacancy creation cost parameter, ci, to 8.7 for both skilled and
unskilled workers, corresponding to about three months of wage for skilled male workers. We set the
lower bound on the distribution of the support for x to zero for both genders. Table 1 summarizes
the calibration of these parameters.
e s ¯ ® ° ys=yu c xf xm
0.625 0.125 0.996 0.72 0.72 1.4565 8.7 0 0
Table 1: Parameter values.
The rest of the parameters are set to closely match a set of salient statistics in the data. These
moments are: the skill premium, the labor force participation rate by gender, the unemployment
rate by gender, and the EU and EE ﬂow rates by gender and skill. The parameters we use to
match these statistics are yi, ·j, xj, ¸ij, and ±ij for i = l;h and j = f;m. Here ·j is the tail end
parameter of the generalized Pareto distribution for x for gender j while xj is the upper bound for
the support of x in the discretized distribution we use in the computation. All these parameters
jointly determine the model outcomes we target; though yi is the most important parameter for
matching the skill premium, ·j and xj are key for matching the labor force participation and the
unemployment rates by gender, and ¸ij and ±ij are most relevant for matching the ﬂows. Table 2
shows the calibrated values and calibration targets. Figure 18 in Appendix D shows the distribution
of x for men and women, and Table 5 reports the corresponding values of the mean and standard
deviations of these distributions.
It is well known that three-state search-matching models typically have diﬃculty matching the
ﬂow rates that involve nonparticipation, as discussed in Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) and Krusell,
13This choice does not guarantee eﬃciency in this model since the Hosios condition need not hold given our wage-
setting mechanism.
181978 Population share ± ¸ ¹ x ·
Women Unskilled 0.465 0.0042 0.0096 9.73 50
Skilled 0.067 0.0048 0.0123
Men
Unskilled 0.375 0.0084 0.0120
7.13 5 Skilled 0.093 0.0042 0.0100
1996 Population share ± ¸ ¹ x ·
Women Unskilled 0.413 0.0042 0.0104 8.61 50
Skilled 0.112 0.0052 0.0123
Men
Unskilled 0.350 0.0120 0.0120
8.15 5 Skilled 0.126 0.0060 0.0100
Table 2: Gender and skill speciﬁc parameter values for 1978 and 1996 calibrations.
Mukoyama, Rogerson, and Şahin (2011). The main reason for this problem is the misclassiﬁcation
error. Abowd and Zellner (1985), Poterba and Summers (1986), and Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin
(2013) show that CPS data on labor market status are subject to misclassiﬁcation error. They ﬁnd
that while the eﬀect of misclassiﬁcation error is mostly negligible for the measurement of stocks, it is
sizable for ﬂows, especially for ﬂows between unemployment and nonparticipation. For the purpose
of our analysis, misclassiﬁcation error is particularly important since its eﬀect on labor market ﬂows
is larger for women. To address this issue, we introduce misclassiﬁcation error in the labor market
status outcomes of our model. In particular, we use the transition matrix estimated by Abowd and
Zellner (1985), which is reported in Table 18 in Appendix D. As a robustness exercise, we also
use the misclassiﬁcation error estimates calculated by Poterba and Summers (1986), and compute
a version of the model without misclassiﬁcation error. These results are presented in Table 19 in
Appendix D. The Poterba and Summers (1986) misclassiﬁcation error estimates are reported in
Table 18.
Data 1978 Model
Women Men Women Men
Unemployment Rate 0.052 0.034 0.052 0.034
LFPR 0.468 0.788 0.468 0.788
Skill premium 1.37 1.44 1.452 1.484
EU Rate 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009
EE Rate 0.95 0.98 0.96 0.98
Data 1978 Model
Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
EU Rate 0.005 0.010 0.006 0.010
EE Rate 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.97
Table 3: Calibration targets and the corresponding model outcomes.
Table 3 reports the 1978 calibration targets and the corresponding model outcomes. All the
targets are matched exactly with the exception of EU ﬂow rate for skilled workers and EE ﬂow
rates for female and unskilled workers. However, the diﬀerences are very small.
19Women Men Women/Men
DATA 1978
E U N E U N E U N
E 0:946 0:010 0:044 E 0:978 0:009 0:013 E 0:97 1:11 3:38
U 0:244 0:474 0:282 U 0:304 0:561 0:134 U 0:80 0:85 2:11
N 0:036 0:014 0:951 N 0:044 0:017 0:939 N 0:82 0:82 1:01
Women Men Women/Men
MODEL
E U N E U N E U N
E 0:962 0:010 0:028 E 0:980 0:009 0:011 E 0:98 1:11 2:55
U 0:306 0:557 0:137 U 0:342 0:573 0:085 U 0:90 0:97 1:61
N 0:019 0:011 0:970 N 0:042 0:018 0:939 N 0:45 0:61 1:03
Table 4: Labor market ﬂows in 1978 and the model outcomes.
5.2 Model’s Implications for 1978
In addition to the targeted outcomes, the model has predictions for labor market ﬂows by gender.
In our calibration, we targeted the EU and EE ﬂow rates by gender and skill.14 Table 4 shows all
the ﬂow transition rates in the data in 1978 for men and women as well as the model’s implications
for these ﬂow rates.15 We also present the ratio of women’s ﬂow rates to men’s to assess the
model’s performance in capturing gender diﬀerences in ﬂow rates. The biggest gender diﬀerences
are in ﬂows involving nonparticipation. In particular, the EN ﬂow rate is around 3 times higher
for women than men and the UN ﬂow rate is about 2 times higher. Interestingly, ﬂows between
unemployment and employment are very similar across genders and clearly not the main source of
the gender unemployment gap. Our model matches these patterns very well. Speciﬁcally, the EN
ﬂow in the model is 2.6 times higher and UN is 1.6 times higher for women relative to men.
As Table 4 shows the model does a very good job in matching the ﬂow rates for men while it
underpredicts the rates of UN, NU and NE ﬂows for women. As shown in Table 19 in Appendix
D, using the correction matrix estimated by Poterba and Summers (1986) mostly resolves this
problem, but then causes an overestimation of the same ﬂow rates for men. We use the Abowd and
Zellner correction as our baseline since Abowd and Zellner’s correction coincides with the alternative
method of purging the data from spurious transitions as implemented by Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin
(2013). Table 19 in Appendix D also shows the model predictions without classiﬁcation error and
shows that introducing misclassiﬁcation error improves the model’s ability to replicate labor market
transition rates substantially. This conﬁrms the importance of adjusting for misclassiﬁcation error
in three-state labor market models.
Our model also has implications for gender wage gap. In our framework, the gender wage gap
arises only because of women’s higher quit rates. High quit rates lower the value of a match formed
with a female worker, especially for high skilled workers for whom the foregone surplus is larger.
14An interesting observation to note is that the EU ﬂow rate was almost identical for men and women in 1978
suggesting that the gender gap in unemployment was not due to diﬀerential job-loss probabilities.
15The table reports transition probabilities from the state given in the row to the state given in the column. For
example, in 1978, the employment-to-unemployment (EU) transition rate was 0.010.
20This mechanism generates a gender wage gap of 10% for unskilled workers and a gap of 12% for
skilled workers. The corresponding values in the data are 65% and 72%, respectively as shown in
Table 9.16 Thus the model captures less than 20% of the gender wage gap in the data. The rest of
the gap in 1978 is likely driven by other factors that we abstract from in our model.
5.3 The Role of Varying Labor Market Attachment: Comparison of 1978 and
1996
As we have shown earlier, the gender unemployment gap virtually disappeared by the mid-1980s.
Our hypothesis is that the change in relative labor force attachment of men and women played an
important role. To quantitatively assess the role of this factor, we select a new target year in the
1990s. We choose 1996 as a new reference year for various reasons: 1. The aggregate unemployment
rate in 1978 and 1996 are almost identical; 2. Both 1978 and 1996 are the mid-points of expansions;
3. Female labor force participation ﬂattened out in mid 1990s (Albanesi and Prados, 2011).
We ﬁrst change parameters that reﬂect the variation in outcomes that are exogenous to our
model: skill distribution, skill premium, and the EU ﬂow rate. We then adjust labor force at-
tachment to match the participation rates by gender in 1996 and evaluate the implications of the
model for the gender unemployment gap. Speciﬁcally, we change the skill composition by gender
to match the 1996 skill distribution. To incorporate the eﬀects of the rising skill premium, we set
productivity diﬀerences between high and low skill workers to match the aggregate skill premium.
In addition, we vary ±ij to match the EU ﬂow rate by gender and skill. Finally, to match the
participation rates by gender in 1996, we change the upper bound of the support of the distribution
of the opportunity cost of work for women and men, ¹ xj, for j = f;m. Table 2 reports the resulting
parameters and Table 5 shows the eﬀect of the change in ¹ x on mean and standard deviation of x
for women and men. In particular, both the mean and the dispersion of the opportunity cost of
market work fall for women between 1978 and 1996, while they rise for men. This change in the
distribution of x is intended to capture a number of factors that have induced women’s attachment
to rise and men’s to fall. For women, these include the improvement of maternal health, the ac-
cess to oral contraceptives, the availability of home appliances, the decline of cultural barriers for
women’s market work, and a possible decline in gender discrimination. For men we capture factors
such as the rise in welfare beneﬁts relative to wage income, disability payments and spousal income,
as well as labor demand factors.17 Note that we assume that the parameters ¸ij and ·j remained
unchanged relative to 1978. We discuss this in Section 5.4.2.18
Table 6 shows the unemployment and labor force participation rates by gender in the data and
in the model for both 1978 and 1996. Our model matches both statistics for 1978 perfectly since
it is calibrated to do so. For 1996, our strategy is to match the labor force participation rates
by gender and examine the implications for unemployment. In the data the gap declined from
16We deﬁne the gender wage gap as the diﬀerence between male and female wages as a fraction of male wages.
17See for example, Autor and Duggan (2003) and Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002).
18See Figure 18 in Appendix D for the distributions of x by gender in 1978 and 1998.
21¹ x mean(x) std(x)
1978 1996 1978 1996 1978 1996
Women 9.73 8.61 4.47 3.96 2.96 2.61
Men 7.13 8.15 2.47 2.76 2.18 2.48
Table 5: The eﬀect of the change in ¹ x on mean and standard deviation of x for women and men.
1.8 percentage points to 0.3 percentage points. Our model recalibrated to 1996 predicts a gender
unemployment gap of 0.4 percentage points and thus accounts for almost all of the convergence in
the unemployment rates. We also deﬁne a percentage gender unemployment gap by computing the
ratio of the unemployment gender gap to the male unemployment rate, i.e. (uf ¡ um)=um. With
this metric, the gender unemployment gap declined from 52.9% to 7.1% from 1978 to 1996 in the
data while the model’s prediction is a decline to 8.9%, which implies that the model can account
for 96% of the decline in the percentage gender unemployment gap.
1978 1996
LFPR Data Model Data Model
Women 46:8% 46:8% 58:8% 58:8%
Men 78:8% 78:8% 76:3% 76:3%
Gap (ppts) 32:0 32:0 17:5 17:5
Percentage Gap 40:6% 40:6% 22:9% 22:9%
Unemployment Rate Data Model Data Model
Women 5:2% 5:2% 4:5% 4:9%
Men 3:4% 3:4% 4:2% 4:5%
Gap (ppts) 1:8 1:8 0:3 0:4
Percentage Gap 52:9% 52:9% 7:1% 8:9%
Table 6: Model outcomes for 1978 and 1996.
As we discussed above, the skill distribution, the skill premium, EU ﬂow rates and labor force
attachment all change from 1978 to 1996 in our model. In order to isolate the contribution of each
factor, we change the corresponding set of parameters one at a time and examine their eﬀects on
the participation and unemployment gaps. These results are displayed in Table 7.19 The third row
of the table allows for changes in skill distribution, skill premium, and EU transition rate jointly.
This variant of the model, which does not allow for changes in attachment, predicts a gender gap
of 0.9 percentage points, or 21.4%, for 1996 mainly through a rise in the male unemployment rate
(see Table 19 in Appendix D). Table 7 also reports the outcome of the model where each factor is
changed in isolation and shows that the increase in the male EU rate is an important factor when
one compares 1978 and 1996, even if it is not the main driver of the convergence in the gender
unemployment gap as Figure 8 shows.20 Moreover, the calibration which only allows for the EU
19The full set of results for both years are reported in Appendix D in Table 19.
20As can be seen, the EU ﬂow rate increased from 1978 to 1996, especially for men, but overall there was no
systematic variation in the gender gap in these ﬂows over time. This ﬂow rate is very sensitive to business cycle
22ﬂow rate to change fails to capture the shrinking participation gap in the data. The change in
the skill composition had a minor eﬀect, consistent with our counterfactuals. The rise in the skill
premium also had a small eﬀect on the unemployment gender gap. The table shows that the change
in labor force attachment is the most important single factor explaining the joint evolution of the
gender unemployment and participation gaps.
LFPR Unemployment Rate
Gender Gap Gender Gap Gender Gap Gender Gap
(ppts) relative to male lfpr (ppts) relative to male u
1978 Data 32:0 40:6% 1:8 52:9%
1996 Data 17:5 22:9% 0:3 7:1%
Benchmark Model 17:5 22:9% 0:4 9:5%
EU, skill comp. and premium 29:6 38:8% 0:9 21:4%
EU 29:2 38:3% 1:0 23:8%
Skill composition 31:8 41:7% 1:6 38:1%
Skill premium 32:4 42:5% 1:7 40:5%
Table 7: Eﬀect of diﬀerent components of the model on the gender participation and unemployment gaps.
Table 8 reports the female/male ratios of ﬂow rates. The ﬂow rates that involve nonparticipation
displayed the largest degree of convergence in the data. Our model captures this feature of the data
well. The female/male ratio of the EN ﬂow rate drops from 3.38 to 1.80 in the data, while this
ratio changes from 2.55 to 2.08 in the model. Similarly, UN ﬂow rates display a sizable convergence
both in the data and the model. The NU and NE ﬂow rates display limited convergence for the
years we compare, however, there is a general convergence pattern in the data that is captured by
our model.21
1978 1996
Data Model Data Model
EN 3.38 2.55 1.80 2.08
EU 1.11 1.11 0.92 0.92
NU 0.82 0.61 0.84 0.74
NE 0.82 0.45 0.87 0.85
UN 2.10 1.61 1.58 1.45
UE 0.80 0.89 0.93 0.95
Table 8: Ratio of female ﬂow transition rates to male transition rates in the data and the model.
Table 9 reports the model’s implications for the evolution of gender wage gaps by skill. We ﬁnd
that gender wage gaps virtually disappear in the 1996 calibration of the model. This outcome is
due to the fact that the rise in women’s labor force attachment causes their quit rates to get closer
to men’s. Since quit rates are similar, the value associated to hiring male and female workers also
ﬂuctuations and the variation mostly reﬂects business cycle variation rather than a long-term pattern.
21Note that all the NE ﬂows in the model are driven by misclassiﬁcation error since we do not allow nonparticipants
to receive job oﬀers.
231978 1996
Data Model Data Model
Unskilled 1.65 1.10 1.40 1.02
Skilled 1.72 1.12 1.49 1.01
Table 9: The gender wage gap in the data and the model.
converges, causing the gender wage gap to decrease. In the data, a substantial gender wage gap
still remains, suggesting that the remaining gap is most likely due to other factors that we abstract
from in our model. In Section 5.4.1, we consider alternative wage setting mechanisms.
5.4 Robustness
This section discusses the eﬀects of two modeling choices we made in our analysis. The ﬁrst is the
choice of our wage setting mechanism and the second is our choice of the parameters that we vary
to match participation in 1996.
5.4.1 Diﬀerent Wage-Setting Mechanisms
In our baseline model, wages are determined through surplus splitting for males for each skill group.
Then we impose that female wages are such that the surplus to a ﬁrm is equalized across genders.
This mechanism endogenously generates gender wage gaps, within each skill group. In this section,
we consider alternative wage-setting mechanisms and repeat our quantitative experiments for each
case. In all these variations, we maintain the assumption that male wages are determined through
the same surplus splitting mechanism described in Section 4.2 and let the female wage setting vary.
The cases we consider are:
1. Surplus splitting by sex: wages are determined for men and women separately through surplus
splitting within each skill group. Men’s and women’s bargaining powers are set to the same
value.
2. Exogenous gender wage gap: wages are determined for men through surplus splitting and the
female wages are set such that gender wage gap is exogenously matched for each skill group.
3. Diﬀerent bargaining power: wages are determined for men through surplus splitting and the
female bargaining power is set so that the gender wage gap is satisﬁed for each skill group.
The female bargaining power that matches the gender wage gap in 1978 is 0.26.
We recalibrate our model for each of these three wage-setting mechanisms for 1978 and then
repeat the exercise performed for the baseline case to examine the implications of the model for
the gender unemployment gap in 1996. All three models are calibrated in a similar fashion to
the benchmark model with the exception of the diﬀerent bargaining power case, which targets the
gender wage gap using the bargaining power of women as a free parameter. Table 10 shows the
24implied unemployment gender gaps under diﬀerent wage-setting mechanisms. All models generate
very similar unemployment gender gaps for 1996 and explain the convergence in male and female
unemployment rates. In all experiments, the unemployment rate is above its observed level. Recall
that we do not target the unemployment rate in 1996. Since the model does not match all the ﬂow
rates perfectly, most importantly the UN transition rate, there is a discrepancy between the actual
and model-implied unemployment rates. The full set of results for these cases are reported in the
Appendix D in Table 20.
Unemployment Rate Unemployment Gender Gap
Men Women ppts as a fraction of male u
1996 Data 4:2% 4:5% 0:3 7:1%
Benchmark 4:5% 4:9% 0:4 8:9%
Surplus splitting by sex 4:6% 4:8% 0:2 4:3%
Exogenous gender wage gap 4:6% 4:7% 0:1 2:2%
Diﬀerent bargaining power 4:6% 4:7% 0:1 2:2%
Table 10: Eﬀect of diﬀerent wage setting mechanisms on the gender unemployment gap.
The exogenous gender wage gap and diﬀerent bargaining power speciﬁcations, by construction,
match the gender wage gap by skill. However, for surplus splitting by gender this is not the case. As
reported in Table 11, assuming surplus splitting in segmented markets by gender and skill generates
a negative gender wage gap, implying a higher wage for women than men for each skill group. The
reason is that since women’s surplus conditional on the wage is smaller than men’s, due to their
greater opportunity cost of working, women have a higher outside option resulting in higher wages.22
1978 1996
Data Model Data Model
Unskilled 1.65 0.98 1.40 0.97
Skilled 1.72 0.98 1.49 0.96
Table 11: The gender wage gap in the data and the model with surplus splitting for men and women.
The baseline wage determination mechanism suggests that the convergence in labor market
attachment generated a convergence in wages across genders but captures only a small fraction of
the gender wage gap in the data, both in 1978 and in 1996. Since attachment is positively related
to wages in the model, it is interesting to explore the impact of the declining gender wage gap on
gender diﬀerences in participation and unemployment rates.
To do so, we employ the exogenous gender wage gap version of the model, where female wages
are set to match the gender wage gap in 1978 and 1996, given male wages. As reported in Table 10,
this version of the model has the ability to account for virtually all the convergence in unemployment
rates over this time period. Here, we explore the contribution of the declining gender wage gap, by
22For the same reason, assuming take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers by ﬁrms will also result in a counterfactual prediction for
the gender wage gap.
25allowing only this variable to change between 1978 and 1996. We also run an experiment in which
in addition to the gender wage gap, we vary the additional exogenous variables (EU rates, skill
composition and skill premium) between the two years. The results are displayed in Table 12.
LFPR Unemployment Rate
Gender Gap Gender Gap Gender Gap Gender Gap
(ppts) relative to male lfpr (ppts) relative to male u
1996 Data 17:5 22:9% 0:3 7:1%
Gender Wage Gap 26:9 34:3% 1:7 51:5%
Skill Comp., Skill Premium,
29:2 31.9% 1:0 19.3% EU and Gender Wage Gap
Table 12: Contribution of the declining gender wage gap to the convergence in attachment and unemployment
rates.
As shown in Table 9, the male/female wage ratio drops from 1:65 to 1:40 for unskilled workers,
and from 1:72 to 1:49 for skilled workers between 1978 and 1996. Yet, this increase in relative wages
for women only brings the gap in labor force participation rate by 26:9 percentage points or 34:3%
in the model, while it drops to 17:5 percentage points or 22:9% in the data. Similarly, while the
gap in unemployment rates drops to 0:3 percentage points or 7:1% in the data, in the model the
gap is still 1:7 percentage points or 51:5%, little changed from 1978. Little is changed when the
additional exogenous variables are also allowed to adjust to 1996 values. Based on these results, we
conclude that the convergence in wages had a small impact on the convergence in participation and
the decline in the gender unemployment gap.
5.4.2 Parameters Aﬀecting Participation Decisions
Our calibration strategy has been to vary the upper bound of the support of the distribution of the
opportunity cost of work for women and men. Recall that each individual draws a value of x at time
0 and samples a new draw of x in each period with probability ¸ij 2 [0;1] where this probability
depends on the individual’s gender and skill. To summarize, ¸ aﬀects the frequency of changes in
individual’s attitude towards work while x aﬀects their valuation of being in the labor force. In
particular, one can think of events like marriage, having children as events that could potentially
change the trade-oﬀ between working or not. ¸ aﬀects how frequent these events are.
As we have discussed before there is no direct evidence to calibrate the gender and skill speciﬁc
¸ values. In our calibration strategy we set the values of these parameters to minimize the distance
between the model implied and actual calibration targets and do not change their values when we
conduct our 1996 experiments. This strategy is based on the notion that the opportunity cost of
work has changed dramatically in the last 30 years, while the frequency of life changing events did
not notably change.23 However, even if the frequency of these life changing events have not changed
much, their impact on the trade-oﬀ between working and not working has changed considerably as
23For example, fertility rates from 1978 to 1996 were essentially unchanged (Albanesi and Olivetti, 2010).
260 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0.38
0.4
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.5
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
F
e
m
a
l
e
 
l
f
p
r
Average Duration of x (years)
benchmark + exogenous changes 
higher λ  lower λ 
Figure 9: Female labor force participation rate as a function of average duration of opportunity cost of work (x).
discussed in Section 8. Another reason not to vary the parameter ¸ between 1978 and 1996 is that
its value has to change dramatically in order to match the increase in women’s participation. We
illustrate this point in Figure 9.
We start from our 1978 calibration and change the parameters that reﬂect the variation in
outcomes that are exogenous to our model: skill distribution, skill premium, and EU transition
rate and compute the female labor force participation rate. Changes in these exogenous parameters
increase the female participation rate from 46.8% to 51.5%, as seen in Table 19 in Appendix D.
Then instead of changing the upper bound of the support of the distribution of x, we change the
frequency of the x shock, which corresponds to the parameter ¸, and recompute our model. In
particular, the ¸ values we pick correspond to an average duration between 3 to 42 years. As the
ﬁgure shows, even with an extreme increase of the duration for the x shock to 42 years, the female
labor force participation rate only rises as high as 55%, while it was 58.8% in 1996. In other words,
for the majority of the increase in participation to arise from a change in the frequency of x shocks,
the opportunity cost of work should essentially be unchanged throughout the working life of an
individual. Even this extreme case still falls short of accounting for increase in female participation.
The other parameter that aﬀects the distribution of x is the tail index (shape) parameter ·.
This parameter can also potentially aﬀect participation decisions. Our calibration strategy was to
set the value of this parameter for our 1978 calibration to attain the minimum distance between
our targets and the data. However, we did not change its value for neither men nor women in our
1996 calibration. The main reason for this choice is the unresponsiveness of the participation rate
to this parameter. · essentially determines the shape of the distribution and it is important for low
values of x. For these values of x, agents in our model always participate in the labor force. The
27eﬀect of the shape parameter gets smaller as x increases and this is where the agents on the margin
of participation/nonparticipation are. As a result, the shape parameter turns out to be much less
important than the upper bound of the distribution which has a direct eﬀect on the mass of the
marginal workers.
6 The Eﬀect of Labor Force Attachment on the Unemployment
Rate
Our quantitative analysis suggests that there is a link between the convergence of labor force attach-
ment of men and women and the evolution of the unemployment gender gap. A broader implication
of our ﬁnding is that if workers become less attached to the labor force, this could potentially
cause an increase in the trend unemployment rate. This intuition might seem counterintuitive at
ﬁrst glance since decline in participation is generally associated with a decline in the unemploy-
ment rate. We show that the eﬀect of a decline in labor force participation arising from declining
attachment is not trivial and there are diﬀerent forces at work.
To understand the intuition behind our result, let us deﬁne the unemployment rate for gender
j as
Uj
Uj + Ej
=
1
1 +
Ej
Uj
where Uj and Ej are the number of unemployed and employed for gender j = f;m, respectively. This
identity shows that the response of the unemployment rate to the change in labor force attachment
depends on the response of the ratio Ej=Uj.
We illustrate the intuition by focusing on the change in attachment for men. Recall that in our
1996 experiment, we change the upper bound of the support of the distribution of the opportunity
cost of work to capture the eﬀect of the change in attachment. For men, this implies an increase in
the upper bound of the support to capture the decline in attachment. When this upper bound, ¹ xm
rises, there are more men in the population with higher opportunity cost of work. Consequently,
the number of employed men, (Em), declines. At the same time, the number of unemployed men,
(Um), also goes down since the value of being unemployed is lower due to the rise in the opportunity
cost of work. As a result, both employment and unemployment go down for men causing a decline
in male participation. What happens to the unemployment rate depends on the relative change
in employment and unemployment. We ﬁnd that in all variations of our model that we consider
the employment eﬀect dominates and Em=Um decreases with ¹ x. The left panel of Figure 10 shows
how Em=Um and male unemployment rate varies as ¹ xm rises from its 1978 value to its 1996 value
by simulating the model at 20 intermediate values. As the ﬁgure shows the unemployment rate
increases as ¹ xm rises since the decline in employment dominates the decline in unemployment. For
women, since attachment rises from 1978 to 1996, the opposite happens and the unemployment rate
goes down as employment rises more relative to the rise in unemployment as seen in the right panel
of Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Employment-to-unemployment ratio and the unemployment rate as a function of ¹ x for men (left panel)
and women (right panel).
Even though our analysis focused on the convergence of male and female unemployment rates,
it also provides a useful framework to assess the potential impacts of the declining participation
rate in the U.S. We discuss this issue in the next subsection.
6.1 Implications for the Great Recession
Since December 2007, the start of the Great Recession, conditions in the U.S. labor market have
been persistently weak. In addition to high unemployment, the labor force participation rates have
also gone down considerably for both men and women, as Figure 11 shows. In this subsection, we
examine the eﬀect of a decline in participation on the unemployment rate.24
Before we move on to our analysis, it is important to keep in mind that a declining participation
rate mechanically lowers the unemployment rate, if the employment-to-population ratio is constant.
We use the decomposition in Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2010, 2013) that shows the relation between
the variation in employment and labor force participation and the ﬂuctuations in unemployment to
quantify this mechanical eﬀect:
¢ut ¼ ¢log(lfprt) ¡ ¢log(Et=Pt)
where ¢ut is the change in the unemployment rate, ¢log(lfprt) is the log change in the labor
force participation rate, and ¢log(Et=Pt) is the log change in employment-to-population ratio.
This equation shows that declines in the labor force participation rate, (lfprt), would cause the
unemployment rate to rise less for any given decline in the employment-to-population ratio, (Et=Pt).
In Table 13 we apply this decomposition to two periods: March 2007 to October 2009, which
24There is ongoing debate about the nature of this decline in participation and whether it reﬂects cyclical or trend
factors. One possibility is that this drop is a reﬂection of the ongoing decline in labor force attachment that is due
to the aging of the population and the ﬂattening of female participation.
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Figure 11: Evolution of the labor force participation rate for men and women since 2007.
corresponds to the drastic ramp-up in the unemployment rate, and October 2009 to January 2013,
which corresponds to the ongoing recovery. According to this decomposition, if the participation
rate remained constant, the unemployment rate would have risen even more during the recession
and it would have barely went down during the recovery. In the recovery period, the employment-to-
population ratio was virtually constant, and the decline in the unemployment rate was a reﬂection
of the decline in participation. The bottom line of this table is that declining participation had a
moderating eﬀect on the unemployment rate.
Period ¢u ¢log(lfpr) ¢log(E=P)
March 2007-Oct 2009 0.056 -0.018 -0.079
Oct 2009-Jan 2013 -0.021 -0.022 0.002
Table 13: Decomposition of the rise in the unemployment rate for the March 2007-Oct 2009 and Oct 2009-Jan 2013
periods.
This conclusion, however, is misleading since it does not take into account the eﬀect of declining
labor force attachment on ﬂow dynamics. To illustrate this, we use our model to quantitatively
assess the eﬀect of a decline in labor force attachment on the future path of the unemployment
rate. We ﬁrst calibrate our model to 2009 and match the gender-speciﬁc unemployment and labor
force participation rates. Then we change the upper bound of the support of the distribution
of the opportunity cost of work so that the participation rate declines. Since the decline in the
participation rate so far was around 3 percentage points relative to 2007, we examine the eﬀect of
a 3 percentage point decline. We also analyze the eﬀect of a 5 percentage point decline to capture
the impact of any potential future decline. Table 14 summarizes our ﬁndings. Our results show
that a 3 percentage point decline in labor force participation rate arising from weaker labor force
attachment causes a 0.1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. If the decline is 5
30percentage points, the eﬀect on the unemployment rate becomes 0.2 percentage point.
Total Men Women
lfpr u lfpr u lfpr u
Data 2009 67% 7.6% 75% 8.5% 60% 6.8%
3 ppts decline 64% 7.7% 72% 8.6% 57% 6.9%
5 ppts decline 62% 7.8% 70% 8.7% 55% 7.0%
Table 14: Labor force participation and unemployment rates in 2009 and with weaker labor force attachment.
The intuition behind this ﬁnding lies in understanding the behavior of ﬂows. Weak labor force
attachment makes workers more likely to drop out of the labor force which increases the ﬂow rate
from unemployment to nonparticipation and reduces the stock and the duration of unemployment.
However, it also makes workers more likely to quit their jobs to nonparticipation, reducing employ-
ment. We show that the second eﬀect dominates quantitatively and weaker attachment puts upward
pressure on the unemployment rate despite causing the duration of unemployment to be lower.25
Hence, the notion that a decline in participation should lead inevitably to a fall in unemployment
based on the standard decomposition is an example of a stock-ﬂow fallacy.
Our critique for using stock-based decompositions to understand the eﬀect of participation on
unemployment is similar to the one made by Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2013), who caution that
the cyclical behavior of the labor force participation rate is itself the outcome of interactions of
movements in worker ﬂow rates, just like the unemployment rate. Their analysis mostly focuses
on cyclical ﬂuctuations in the unemployment rate rather than the trend changes in unemployment.
While they overcome the stock-ﬂow fallacy by using a ﬂow-based variance decomposition, we make
use of our structural model.
7 Cyclical Properties of Unemployment Rates by Gender
As we have shown in Figure 2, male unemployment has always been more cyclical relative to female
unemployment. Despite the convergence of gender-speciﬁc unemployment rates, this pattern has not
changed since 1948. We show that a substantial part of these cyclical diﬀerences in unemployment
rates by gender can be attributed to diﬀerences in industry distribution of men and women.
In Section 2, we calculated a counterfactual unemployment rate for women by assigning the male
industry composition to the female labor force in order to isolate the role of industry distributions.
Figure 12 shows both the actual and counterfactual rise in the female unemployment rates against
the rise in the male unemployment rate by zooming in periods where the unemployment rate ex-
hibited substantial swings. In particular, we start from the aggregate unemployment trough of the
previous expansion and continue until the unemployment rate reaches its pre-recession level. For the
2001 and 2007-09 recessions, since the unemployment rate does not reach its pre-recession trough
25These model predictions echo the empirical ﬁndings in Abraham and Shimer (2002) who argue that rising female
attachment caused an increase in the duration of unemployment relative to the unemployment rate for women in the
1980s and 1990s.
31after the recession, we focus on a 12-quarter period for the 2001 recession and use all available data
for the 2007-2009 cycle. We ﬁnd that industry composition explains around half of the gender gap
during the recessions.
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Figure 12: Counterfactual unemployment rates. Source: Current Population Survey.
We also use the Current Employment Statistics (CES), known as the payroll survey, to compute
the payroll employment changes during recessions and recoveries. Since payroll employment data
are available starting from 1964 by gender, it allows us to consider employment changes for the
earlier recessions as well.26 For recessions, we report the percentage change in employment from
the trough to the peak in aggregate unemployment for each cycle. For recoveries, we report the
percentage change in employment from the peak to the trough in the aggregate unemployment rate
26However, the CES only provides information about payroll employment changes and does not allow us to study
unemployment changes. While participation margin is important in cyclical ﬂuctuations in the unemployment rate,
since employment changes are the main driver of unemployment ﬂuctuations (see Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin, 2013)
these counterfactuals are still informative.
32except for the 2007-2009 cycle, for which we use all available data.
As Table 15 shows, employment declines have always been higher for men than for women.27 To
isolate the eﬀect of industry distributions, we assign the male industry distribution to the female
labor force. For the last three recessions, the diﬀerence in industry distribution explains more than
70 percent of the gender diﬀerences in payroll employment changes.28 For the earlier recessions,
it can explain about 40 percent to two-thirds of the gender diﬀerences with the exception of the
1979 recession, where almost all gender diﬀerences are explained by gender diﬀerences in industry
distributions.29
Recessions Men Women Women
Actual Actual Counterfactual
12/1969-12/1970 -1.35% +0.69% -0.65%
10/1973-5/1975 -3.26% +2.16% -0.31%
5/1979-7/1980 -2.04% +3.11% -1.86%
7/1981-11/1982 -4.97% -0.52% -2.28%
7/1990-6/1992 -2.74% 0.81% -1.70%
12/2000-6/2003 -3.16% -0.72% -4.72%
8/2007-10/2009 -8.34% -3.28% -7.47%
Table 15: Actual and counterfactual employment changes during recessions by gender.
Table 16 reports the employment changes during recoveries. Up until the early 1990s, employ-
ment growth was much larger for women than for men in the recoveries, despite the fact that men
experienced larger job losses in the recessions.30 Assigning to women the industry distribution of
men has virtually no eﬀect on the resulting employment change. For the 1991 cycle, the change in
employment in the recovery was approximately the same for men and women, whereas for the 2001
cycle it was lower. For these two cycles, industry composition cannot explain the gender diﬀerences
in employment growth. For the 2007-2009 cycle, women’s employment grew by 2.25% during the
recovery, whereas male employment rose by 5.17%. Assigning women the same industry distribu-
tion as men implies a counterfactual change in employment of 0.77% for women, suggesting that
the recovery in employment for women would have been even weaker if they shared men’s industry
distribution. These observations suggest that gender diﬀerences in employment changes were mostly
driven by participation patterns during recoveries rather than diﬀerences in gender composition of
diﬀerent industries.
To summarize, industry distribution explains most of the gender diﬀerences in employment
growth in the last three recessions, and about half of this diﬀerences in earlier recessions, but it
27For this exercise, we focus on 12 broad industry groups, while the unemployment rate counterfactual focuses on
only 3 broad sectors.
28See Şahin, Hobijn, and Song (2009) for a detailed analysis of gender diﬀerences in unemployment during the
Great Recession.
29The fraction explained by industry distribution is computed as one minus the ratio of the percentage diﬀerence
after composition is taken into account to the actual percentage diﬀerence.
30Albanesi and Şahin (2013) show that this behavior is a consequence of the sharp rise in female participation
during this period.
33Recoveries Men Women Women
Actual Actual Counterfactual
12/1970-12/1973 8.06% 14.12% 16.22%
5/1975-5/1978 9.31% 18.72% 20.83%
7/1980-7/1983 -2.84% 5.52% 4.11%
11/1982-11/1985 8.13% 14.42% 14.59%
6/1992-6/1995 7.92% 7.81% 7.04%
6/2003-6/2006 5.98% 3.38% 3.24%
10/2009-4/2012 5.17% 2.25% 0.77%
Table 16: Actual and counterfactual employment changes during recoveries by gender.
cannot account for the gender diﬀerences in employment in recoveries. Albanesi and Şahin (2013)
examine in detail the impact of labor force participation trends on aggregate employment growth
and of the evolution of employment by industry and occupation.
8 International Evidence
We conclude with an analysis of the international evidence on the link between labor force at-
tachment and the unemployment rate. Our analysis has two main implications for cross-country
patterns: 1. Countries with lower participation gaps, on average, should also exhibit lower unem-
ployment gaps; 2. Countries which have experienced closing participation gaps over time should
have experienced closing unemployment gaps. We examine these two implications using data on
labor force participation and the unemployment rate by gender for a group of 19 advanced OECD
countries, starting from 1970.
Figure 13 displays the average percentage gender gap in labor force participation, deﬁned as
(Lm ¡ Lf)=Lm, and the average percentage gender gap in unemployment, given by (uf ¡ um)=um
for 19 OECD countries throughout the whole sample period. There is a clear positive relation, with
a correlation of 0.53, between the participation and unemployment gender gaps suggesting that the
ﬁrst implication of our analysis is supported by the data.
We have seen that for the U.S., the unemployment gender gap closed as female labor force
participation rose. We next examine if this pattern is also observed in other countries by comparing
the evolution of the participation and unemployment gaps over time in Table 17. In particular, we
compute the participation and unemployment gaps for pre-1985 and post-1985 periods for a subset
of countries.31 The table shows that the participation gap became smaller for all countries in our
sample. The unemployment gap also followed a similar pattern for most of the countries: shrank or
completely closed, with the exception of the Netherlands and Spain. For Finland and Ireland, the
unemployment gap was negative both before and after 1985. Table 17 shows that in most countries
the closing participation gaps were accompanied by shrinking unemployment gaps, consistent with
the implications of our analysis.
31These are the countries that we have data for at least for ten years before 1985.
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Figure 13: Percentage gender gaps in labor force participation (Lm ¡ Lf)=Lm and percentage gender gaps in
unemployment (uf ¡ um)=um for 19 OECD countries.
Participation Gap Unemployment Gap
pre-1985 post-1985 pre-1985 post-1985
Australia 45.8% 23.4% 86.1% 1.7%
Canada 33.6% 16.3% 14.3% -6.9%
Finland 20.1% 7.8% -29.7% -5.6%
Germany 40.8% 22.5% 40.0% 16.5%
Ireland 61.2% 35.1% -23.6% -7.3%
Italy 57.0% 38.7% 110.2% 86.5%
Netherlands 56.9% 25.8% -9.7% 41.8%
Norway 31.8% 11.8% 85.8% -4.1%
Portugal 41.3% 21.6% 172.2% 53.2%
Spain 62.0% 37.1% 14.6% 72.5%
Sweden 26.7% 6.9% 32.1% -7.2%
United States 41.1% 17.9% 30.7% -3.3%
Table 17: Participation and unemployment gender gaps (in percentage) before and after 1985.
In Appendix E, we investigate country speciﬁc patterns in more detail, and examine the evolution
of labor force participation and the unemployment rate by gender for a group of 19 advanced OECD
countries at an annual frequency starting from 1970. We show that while in general the same pattern
holds over time, a distinct pattern is observed for some countries in the earlier years. In particular,
in Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, there was an initial rise in the gender
unemployment gap, associated with the initial rise in the growth of female labor force participation.
One common characteristic of these countries was the initial very high participation gaps. This
pattern is also observed in the U.S. in the early 1950s and early 1960s when the participation
gap was still substantial and the female participation rate was increasing very rapidly. Research
on the U.S. suggests that the composition of the female labor force likely played an important
35role. The initial fast growth in female labor force participation in the U.S. was mostly driven by
younger women with low levels of labor market experience. In addition, married women who entered
the labor force in the earlier periods tended to have low labor market attachment relative to the
unmarried women who were already in the labor force (Goldin, 1990).32 As we show in Section
2, age and skill composition stopped playing a role in accounting for the gender unemployment
gap in the U.S. starting in the mid-1970s. While we do not provide a detailed analysis of these
compositional forces for our international sample due to data availability issues, the U.S. experience
suggests that they may be important in explaining the time path of the gender unemployment gap
for countries with initially high participation gaps.
9 Concluding Remarks
We study the determinants of gender gaps in unemployment in the long run and over the business
cycle. We show that while the trend component of unemployment has converged by gender over time,
the cyclical component has remained stable. We attribute the closing of the gender unemployment
gap since the 1970s to the convergence in labor market attachment of women and men and assess
the contribution of this factor with a calibrated three-state search model of the labor market. We
ﬁnd that our model accounts for almost all of the convergence in the unemployment rates by gender
in the data. The change in labor force attachment accounts for almost half of this convergence. A
broad implication of this ﬁnding is that the low unemployment rates that prevailed in the 1990s can
be partially attributable to the increase in female labor force attachment. Evidence from nineteen
advanced OECD economies suggests that the convergence in participation is associated with a
decline in the gender unemployment gap for almost all countries.
We also examine the determinants of the cyclical behavior of unemployment by gender em-
pirically. We ﬁnd that the unemployment rate rises more for men than women during recessions.
We show that this diﬀerence can mostly be explained by gender diﬀerences in industry distribution.
However, this factor does not explain the gender diﬀerences in employment growth in the recoveries,
which are mostly driven by participation trends.
The model we developed also has interesting implications for the link between labor force attach-
ment and the unemployment rate. While the prevailing simplistic view is that declining participation
puts downward pressure on the unemployment rate, our model shows that this is not necessarily
true. As discussed by Abraham and Shimer (2002), weak labor force attachment makes workers
more likely to drop out of the labor force, which reduces the duration of unemployment. However,
it also makes workers more likely to quit their jobs to nonparticipation. These counteracting eﬀects
are present in our model and we have shown that, for both women and men, the second eﬀect
dominated in the 1980s and 1990s, generating a positive relationship between the participation gap
and the unemployment rate gap.
32This pattern is consistent with the dynamics of the gender wage gap over the same period, which temporarily
increased due to the dilution of skills and experience associated with the new female entrants (O’Neill 1985, Smith
and Ward 1989, O’Neill and Polacheck 1993).
36In addition to providing a useful framework to analyze gender diﬀerences in the unemployment
rate, our analysis also has important implications for the aggregate unemployment rate in the U.S.
Following the same logic, we also address the eﬀect of the recent decline in participation that
accompanied the weakness in the labor market. Various factors, like the aging of the population
and the ﬂattening of the female participation, suggest the possibility of a less attached labor force
going forward. Using our model, we show that a 5 percentage point decline in the labor force
participation rate arising from declining attachment would increase the unemployment rate by 0.2
percentage points, everything else being equal. This calculation shows that the common wisdom
that declining participation would cause a decline in the unemployment rate is misguided.
Another broad implication of our analysis is related to cross-country diﬀerences in the unem-
ployment rate. Azmat, Guell, and Manning (2006) have shown that cross-country variation in
unemployment rates is mostly driven by diﬀerences in women’s unemployment. Our ﬁndings sug-
gest that this diﬀerence may in large part be due to diﬀerences in female labor force participation.
Since labor force attachment is inﬂuenced by ﬁscal and social policies like the marginal tax on sec-
ond earners or maternity leave laws, cross-country diﬀerences in unemployment rates are aﬀected
by these policies as well.
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Figure 14: The labor force share of men (left panel) and women (right panel) in diﬀerent industries. Source:
Current Population Survey.
B Occupation Composition
Gender diﬀerences in the distribution of workers across occupation have also been sizable. The share
of male workers is higher in production occupations, while the share of female workers is higher in
sales and oﬃce occupations as Figure 16 shows.
To assess the role of occupation composition, we compute a counterfactual unemployment rate
for women, in which we assign women the male occupational distribution. The results are displayed
in the left panel of Figure 17. The counterfactual unemployment rate for women is higher than
the actual unemployment rate, and higher than men’s unemployment rate starting in the mid
1990s. This ﬁnding is driven in part by the high unemployment rate of women in male dominated
occupations in this period, particularly production occupations.
We also compute a counterfactual unemployment rate for women using the categorization in
Acemoglu and Autor (2011), in which occupations are divided into four categories, Cognitive/Non-
Routine, Cognitive/Routine, Manual/Non-Routine, and Manual/Routine. As shown in the right
panel of Figure 16, the share of men in Manual/Routine tasks is relatively high, while the share
of women in high is Manual/Non-Routine tasks. Moreover, the share of women in Cognitive/Non-
Routine tasks, which started out lower than men’s, has been growing at a faster rate than men’s,
leading to a 60% share of Non-Routine tasks for women by 2010, compared to a share of 45% for
men. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) document the decline of employment in routine tasks starting in
the 1990s, which could have led to a corresponding rise in the unemployment rate for men, relative
41to that of women. Figure 17 suggests that female unemployment would have indeed been higher
since the early 1990s if their occupation composition was the same as men’s. However, occupation
composition with this categorization does not account for the gender unemployment gap in the early
years of the sample.
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Figure 15: The labor force share of men (left panel) and women (right panel) in diﬀerent occupations. Source:
Current Population Survey.
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Figure 16: The labor force share of men (left panel) and women (right panel) in diﬀerent occupation categories.
Source: Current Population Survey.
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Figure 17: Actual and counterfactual unemployment rates by occupation groups (left panel), and by occupations
grouped following Acemoglu and Autor (2010) (right panel). Source: Current Population Survey.
C Optimal Decision Rules and Worker Flows
The workers’ optimal decision rules and corresponding workers ﬂows depend on the relation
between the cut-oﬀ values xa
ij; xn
ij; x
q
ij that deﬁne the reservation strategies. These three cut-oﬀs
can be ordered in six possible combinations, but only two cases are in fact possible under the
assumption that vW
ij (xj) > vS
ij(xj) > vN
ij(xj) with 0 < s < e:
² xa
ij < x
q
ij < xn
ij
The employment ﬂows for this case are:
Eij;t+1 = Eij;t(1 ¡ ±ij)
£
¸ijFj(xa
ij) + 1 ¡ ¸ij
¤
+ Uij;tpiFj(xa
ij); (14)
Uij;t+1 = Eij;t(1 ¡ ±ij)¸ij
£
Fj(xn
ij) ¡ Fj(xa
ij)
¤
+ Eij;t±ijFj(xn
ij) (15)
+Uij;t(1 ¡ pi)
£
1 ¡ ¸ij + ¸ijFj(xn
ij)
¤
+ Uij;tp
£
Fj(xn
ij) ¡ Fj(xa
ij)
¤
+ Nij;t¸ijFj(xn
ij);
Nij;t+1 = Nij;t
£
1 ¡ ¸ij + ¸ij(1 ¡ Fj(xn
ij))
¤
+ Uij;t
£
(1 ¡ pi)¸ij(1 ¡ Fj(xn
ij)) + pi(1 ¡ Fj(xn
ij))
¤
(16)
+Eij;t
£
±ij
¡
1 ¡ Fj(xn
ij)
¢
+ (1 ¡ ±ij)¸ij(1 ¡ Fj(xn
ij)
¤
:
The third equation can also be replaced by:
Nij;t+1 = 1 ¡ Eij;t+1 ¡ Uij;t+1;
43since this relation must hold in every period.
The steady state stocks can be solved by ﬁrst solving for Eij as a function of Uij from the
equation for Uij;t+1:
Eij =
UijpiFj(xa
ij)
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±i)[¸jFj(xa
ij) + 1 ¡ ¸ij]
;
Uij =
¸ijFj(xn
ij)
1 ¡ Aij ¡
h
(1 ¡ pi)(1 ¡ ¸ij + ¸ijFj(xn
ij)) + pi(Fj(xn
ij) ¡ Fj(xa
ij)) ¡ ¸ijFj(xn
ij)
i;
where
Aij =
piFj(xa
ij)
h
(1 ¡ ±ij)¸ij(Fj(xn
ij) ¡ F(xa
ij)) + (±ij ¡ ¸ij)Fj(xn
ij)
i
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±ij)[¸ijFj(xa
ij) + 1 ¡ ¸ij]
;
and
Nij = 1 ¡ Eij ¡ Uij;
for i = l;h and j = f;m.
² xn
ij < x
q
ij < xa
ij
The employment ﬂows for this case are:
Eij;t+1 = Eij;t(1 ¡ ±ij)
h
¸ijFj(x
q
ij) + 1 ¡ ¸ij
i
+ Uij;tpiFj(x
q
ij);
Uij;t+1 = Eij;t±Fj(xn
ij) + Uij;t(1 ¡ pi)
£
1 ¡ ¸ij + ¸ijFj(xn
ij)
¤
+ Nij;t¸ijFj(xn
ij);
Nij;t+1 = Nij;t
£
1 ¡ ¸ij + ¸ij(1 ¡ Fj(xn
ij))
¤
+ Uij;t
h
(1 ¡ pi)¸ij(1 ¡ Fj(xn
ij)) + pi(1 ¡ Fj(x
q
ij))
i
+Eij;t
h
±ij
¡
1 ¡ Fj(xn
ij)
¢
+ (1 ¡ ±ij)¸ij(1 ¡ Fj(x
q
ij)
i
;
for i = l;h and j = f;m.
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Figure 18: The distribution of x for men and women in 1978 (left panel) and in 1996 (right panel).
Women Men
Abowd and Zellner
REPORTED REPORTED
TRUE E U N TRUE E U N
E 0:9826 0:0020 0:0154 E 0:9916 0:0019 0:0065
U 0:0147 0:8707 0:1146 U 0:023 0:899 0:078
N 0:0042 0:0024 0:9934 N 0:0066 0:0041 0:9893
Women Men
Poterba and Summers
REPORTED REPORTED
E U N E U N
E 0:9811 0:0029 0:016 E 0:99 0:004 0:006
U 0:038 0:794 0:168 U 0:031 0:899 0:07
N 0:0106 0:0062 0:9832 N 0:0378 0:033 0:9292
Table 18: Misclassiﬁcation probabilities estimated by Abowd and Zellner (1985) and Poterba and Summers (1986).
Note that P&S refers to the version of the model with misclassiﬁcation error estimates based on
Poterba and Summers (1986), no misc stands for the version of the model without misclassiﬁcation
error.
451978 1978 1978 1978 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996
Data Model Model Model Data EU Skill prem. Skill comp. EU, sk. prem. Model
P&S no misc only only only and comp. All
TOTAL
u 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.045 0.043 0.049 0.041 0.040 0.048 0.047
lfpr 0.618 0.618 0.618 0.624 0.671 0.644 0.645 0.632 0.656 0.671
E 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.598 0.643 0.614 0.622 0.609 0.627 0.641
EE 0.961 0.970 0.961 0.987 0.967 0.969 0.971 0.971 0.969 0.970
EU 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.011
EN 0.030 0.020 0.029 0.005 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019
UE 0.272 0.323 0.325 0.293 0.271 0.309 0.346 0.340 0.327 0.323
UU 0.515 0.564 0.414 0.702 0.516 0.585 0.546 0.549 0.570 0.576
UN 0.213 0.113 0.260 0.005 0.213 0.106 0.107 0.111 0.103 0.101
NE 0.040 0.030 0.044 0.000 0.035 0.033 0.090 0.033 0.084 0.038
NU 0.015 0.015 0.029 0.008 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.020 0.017
NN 0.945 0.956 0.927 0.992 0.947 0.950 0.892 0.953 0.895 0.946
Skill premium 1.490 1.490 1.489 1.490 1.690 1.479 1.622 1.484 1.623 1.690
MEN
u 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.042 0.044 0.032 0.032 0.043 0.045
lfpr 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.792 0.763 0.797 0.815 0.799 0.811 0.763
E 0.762 0.762 0.762 0.766 0.731 0.763 0.791 0.775 0.778 0.730
EE 0.978 0.980 0.972 0.990 0.973 0.977 0.980 0.980 0.977 0.976
EU 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.012
EN 0.013 0.011 0.019 0.002 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012
UE 0.304 0.342 0.334 0.295 0.282 0.322 0.369 0.359 0.343 0.331
UU 0.561 0.573 0.383 0.702 0.555 0.600 0.554 0.558 0.583 0.586
UN 0.134 0.085 0.283 0.002 0.163 0.078 0.077 0.083 0.074 0.082
NE 0.044 0.042 0.065 0.000 0.038 0.047 0.167 0.047 0.152 0.041
NU 0.017 0.018 0.043 0.009 0.019 0.021 0.024 0.018 0.029 0.019
NN 0.939 0.939 0.892 0.991 0.944 0.932 0.808 0.935 0.819 0.939
Skill premium 1.440 1.484 1.455 1.484 1.750 1.485 1.637 1.486 1.645 1.678
WOMEN
u 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.054 0.045 0.054 0.049 0.048 0.052 0.049
lfpr 0.468 0.468 0.468 0.475 0.588 0.505 0.491 0.481 0.515 0.588
E 0.444 0.445 0.444 0.450 0.562 0.479 0.469 0.458 0.490 0.561
EE 0.946 0.962 0.951 0.984 0.962 0.962 0.963 0.962 0.963 0.965
EU 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011
EN 0.044 0.028 0.038 0.007 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.025
UE 0.244 0.306 0.318 0.290 0.262 0.297 0.325 0.322 0.313 0.315
UU 0.474 0.557 0.442 0.703 0.480 0.572 0.540 0.541 0.558 0.566
UN 0.282 0.137 0.241 0.007 0.258 0.131 0.135 0.137 0.129 0.119
NE 0.036 0.019 0.026 0.000 0.033 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.023 0.035
NU 0.014 0.011 0.016 0.006 0.016 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.014
NN 0.951 0.970 0.957 0.994 0.951 0.966 0.968 0.969 0.965 0.951
Skill premium 1.370 1.452 1.457 1.452 1.600 1.454 1.546 1.459 1.588 1.700
Table 19: Outcomes in the aggregate and by gender in the data and the model for 1978 and 1996.
461978 1978 1978 1978 1978 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996
Data Benchmark Exog. Both Diﬀerent Data Benchmark Exog. Both Diﬀerent
wages Nash ° wages Nash °
TOTAL
u 0.044 0.044 0.043 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.046
lfpr 0.618 0.618 0.618 0.618 0.617 0.671 0.671 0.671 0.671 0.670
E 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.592 0.643 0.641 0.642 0.641 0.641
EE 0.961 0.970 0.968 0.971 0.968 0.967 0.970 0.969 0.971 0.969
EU 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
EN 0.030 0.020 0.022 0.019 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.020 0.018 0.020
UE 0.272 0.323 0.345 0.309 0.343 0.271 0.323 0.348 0.313 0.346
UU 0.515 0.564 0.543 0.577 0.544 0.516 0.576 0.551 0.585 0.553
UN 0.213 0.113 0.112 0.113 0.112 0.213 0.101 0.100 0.102 0.101
NE 0.040 0.030 0.028 0.030 0.027 0.035 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.042
NU 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.017
NN 0.945 0.956 0.957 0.956 0.958 0.947 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.940
Skill premium 1.490 1.490 1.491 1.491 1.503 1.690 1.690 1.688 1.689 1.692
MEN
u 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.042 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.046
lfpr 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.789 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763
E 0.762 0.762 0.762 0.762 0.762 0.731 0.730 0.730 0.729 0.729
EE 0.978 0.980 0.980 0.979 0.980 0.973 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976
EU 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
EN 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
UE 0.304 0.342 0.329 0.348 0.327 0.282 0.331 0.313 0.330 0.308
UU 0.561 0.573 0.585 0.568 0.587 0.555 0.586 0.604 0.588 0.608
UN 0.134 0.085 0.086 0.084 0.086 0.163 0.082 0.083 0.082 0.084
NE 0.044 0.042 0.038 0.043 0.036 0.038 0.041 0.038 0.042 0.033
NU 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.020 0.018
NN 0.939 0.939 0.944 0.938 0.947 0.944 0.939 0.944 0.938 0.948
Skill premium 1.440 1.484 1.413 1.493 1.332 1.750 1.678 1.606 1.690 1.459
WOMEN
u 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.045 0.049 0.047 0.048 0.047
lfpr 0.468 0.468 0.468 0.468 0.466 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.585
E 0.444 0.445 0.444 0.445 0.443 0.562 0.561 0.562 0.561 0.561
EE 0.946 0.962 0.958 0.963 0.958 0.962 0.965 0.962 0.966 0.962
EU 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
EN 0.044 0.028 0.031 0.026 0.032 0.027 0.025 0.027 0.023 0.028
UE 0.244 0.306 0.359 0.276 0.358 0.262 0.315 0.380 0.297 0.380
UU 0.474 0.557 0.506 0.586 0.507 0.480 0.566 0.504 0.582 0.504
UN 0.282 0.137 0.134 0.139 0.135 0.258 0.119 0.116 0.120 0.116
NE 0.036 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.034 0.050
NU 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.013 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.012 0.017
NN 0.951 0.970 0.968 0.971 0.967 0.951 0.951 0.948 0.953 0.933
Skill premium 1.370 1.452 1.356 1.498 1.566 1.600 1.700 1.704 1.697 1.959
Table 20: Outcomes in the aggregate and by gender in the data and the models with diﬀerent wage-setting mech-
anisms for 1978 and 1996.
47E Detailed Cross-Country Analysis
Figure 19 displays the percentage gender gap in labor force participation, deﬁned as (Lm¡Lf)=Lm,
and the percentage gender gap in unemployment, given by (uf ¡ um)=um. The countries are
grouped based on language or geography. The top panel presents data for the English speaking
group, comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and
Ireland. For all these countries, except Ireland, the participation gap drops from around 40% in
the early 1970s to around 15% in 2008, and the unemployment gap is close to zero starting in the
mid-1980s. The U.S. and Canada display a decline in the unemployment gap of approximately 30%
in the preceding period. Australia displays an unemployment gap close to 140% in 1970 from the
early 1970s, and stabilizes close to zero by the early 1990s. By contrast, the unemployment gap
is negative and sizable in magnitude for the U.K., throughout the sample period. In Ireland, the
participation gap is 65% in 1970, and falls to 23% by 2008. The unemployment gap peaks at 8% in
1985, and subsequently declines, reaching levels close to -20% after 2003.
The second panel reports data for the Nordic countries, which start from participation gaps
between 25% and 40% in the early 1970s, and converge to close to 5-10% by the mid-1990s, with most
of the closing of the participation gap achieved by 1985. For Sweden and Norway the unemployment
gap reaches zero in the late 1980s, following a period of sustained decline. Denmark displays a
positive unemployment gap, with an average close to 30%, with little sign of convergence. In
Finland, the unemployment gap starts negative, ﬂuctuating between -25% and 0, before 1995, and
follows a rising trend, becoming positive, but below 10%, after that.
The third panel displays data for continental European countries. The initial participation gap
is typically larger in these countries, ranging from 45% to 65% in the early 1970s, dropping to values
close 15% in 2008 for all countries except Luxembourg, where it reaches 25%. The behavior of the
unemployment gap varies across countries. Belgium, France and Germany exhibit a strong closing
of this gap, starting from initial levels of approximately 130%, 120% and 50%, respectively. In
Germany, the unemployment gap settles around zero by 2002, while it is still around 30% in 2008
in Belgium and France, on a continuing downward trend. In Luxembourg, the unemployment gap
starts from levels close to 100% in the late 1980s, and drops to approximately 35% by 2008. In the
Netherlands, the gap rises from -40% in the early 1970s, to a peak of 80% in the late 1980s, before
declining to values around 25% after 2003.
The fourth panel focusses on southern European countries, in which the initial participation
gap ranges from 48% to 65%, reaching values between 25% and 30% by 2008, for Italy, Spain and
Greece, and close to 20% for Portugal. The unemployment gap rises in the initial phase of the
sample for all these countries, and then declines to varying degrees in the later phase. In Italy, the
unemployment gap rises from 45% to 165% between 1970 and 1977, and declines to approximately
55% by 2008. In Portugal, the unemployment gap rises sharply from 90% in 1974, to 300% in 1981,
and then drops, settling to values close to 30% from the early 1990s.
These ﬁgures suggest two clear patterns. Countries with relatively low gender participation gap
in the 1970s display a monotonic decline of the gender unemployment gap over the sample period,
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Figure 19: ParticipationGap =
Lm¡Lf
Lm , UnemploymentGap =
uf¡um
um . Source: OECD.
49with the unemployment gap settling on values close to zero as the participation gap stabilizes. This
pattern applies to the English speaking countries (except for the UK and Ireland), to the Nordic
countries, and to the continental European countries, except for the Netherlands. In countries
with relatively high initial participation gaps instead, the unemployment gap tends to ﬁrst rise,
sometimes sharply, and then fall. This pattern prevails in the southern European countries and the
Netherlands.
Do these diﬀerent patterns reﬂect fundamental diﬀerences in labor market structure and culture,
or do they reﬂect diﬀerent stages of development? Of course, institutional and cultural diﬀerences
likely play a large role in determining the size of the gender participation gap and the level of
unemployment rate. Diﬀerences in the age structure of the population and fertility may also be
important (Sorrentino, 1983). But the experience of the U.S. suggests that the initial rise in women’s
labor force participation is associated with a rise in the gender unemployment gap. Figure 20 plots
the gender unemployment gap and female labor force participation for the countries that display an
initial rise in the gap, starting in 1960 or at the earliest available date, in addition to the U.S.33 The
ﬁgure shows that the rise in the gender unemployment gap is associated with an initial acceleration
in the rise in female labor force participation. A similar pattern prevails in the U.S., where the
gender unemployment gap rises throughout the 1960s, as the growth in labor force participation
accelerates.
33For the U.S., we use monthly BLS data, smoothed with a 12-month centered moving average.
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Figure 20: Female Labor Force Participation, UnemploymentGap =
uf¡um
um . Source: BLS and OECD.
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